Science and beyond
As we think we live. This is why the assemblage of philosophical ideas is more than a specialist study. It moulds our type of civilization. A.N.Whitehead
Freud’s letters to Fliess during the 1890s reveal a young neurologist struggling to develop a clinical theory of the neuroses and psychoses with the central theme that symptoms resulted from the repression of unpleasant sexual affects whether based on actual events or on phantasies. He gradually lost confidence in his “seduction theory,” not because he ever denied that childhood seduction was emotionally damaging but because the evidence for it often derived from fallible memory. Freud put it his way: “. . . one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect”.
He tried another approach “with a determined effort to examine what shape the theory of mental functioning takes if one introduces quantitative considerations, a sort of economics of nerve forces” [6]. This refers of course to his Project for a Scientific Psychology [7], which he abandoned after much frenetic effort with the words to Fliess: “to me it appears to have been a kind of madness” [6].However, as Kanzer observed,“the project is a set of neurologically clad psychological propositions drawn from clinical observation” [8]. And Mancia [8a] pointed out that: “the language of the Project is only apparently physiological. Substantially it is a
metaphorical language...”. Solms and Saling endorse this view, pointing out that Freud retained many of the ideas in the Project but “none of these was based on the neurophysiology or neuroanatomy of the day” [9]. Of greater significance for the future of psychoanalysis was that, by 1893, Freud had rejected first Meynert’s and then Charcot’s views on the cortical localization of psychological pathology and had adopted John Hughlings Jackson’s approach, which emphasized that complex mental processes are best understood by not trying to isolate them in specific areas in the brain. This view, which Freud had championed in On Aphasia, enabled him to regard the biological aspects of mental functioning and the psychological as separate but interrelated [9–11]. However, almost 40 years later he was, if anything,more pessimistic about understanding this interrelationship:
Everything that lies between [the brain and our acts of consciousness] is unknown to us . . . . If it [knowledge of this interrelationship] existed it would at the most afford an exact localisation of the processes of consciousness and would give us no help towards understanding them.
Fifty-five years later the philosopher Chalmers called this the “hard problem.” Toulmin , quoted by Ulrike May , has pointed out that great investigators often have a “vision” early on in their lives and then devote the rest of their lives to its verification. In Freud’s case it is this vision which dominates the 1890s.He is driven to understand psychic functioning using any intellectual discipline that serves this purpose, but underscored by the conviction that unconscious processes and human sexuality and its repression were essential ingredients in this endeavor.He writes to Fliess in January 1896:
I see, via the detour of medical practice, you are reaching your first ideal of understanding human beings as a physiologist just as I most secretly nourish the hope of arriving, via these same paths, at my initial goal of philosophy. For that is what I wanted originally, when it was not yet at all clear to me to what end I was in the world.
Three months later he repeats the same cri de coeur:
If both of us are still granted a few more years for quiet work, we shall certainly leave behind something that can justify our existence. Knowing this, I feel strong in the face of all daily cares and worries.As a young man I knew no longing other than for philosophical knowledge, and now I am about to fulfil it as I move from medicine to psychology.
The impact of these two quotations is not fully felt until it is realized that Freud uses his own idiosyncratic version of the terms “psychology” and “philosophy.” Ulrike May explains that psychology for Freud at this time “means an overarching explanatory theory forming a more abstract frame of reference in which the clinical findings can be accommodated and whereby they can be systematically linked to each other. As we know, this part of the theory was called metapsychology from February 1896 on.”